Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment
C Fershtman - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1985 - Elsevier
The paper investigates two interrelated problems. The first is the output choice of a firm in
which decisions are made cooperatively by managers who might have conflicting objectives.
The second is the managerial incentives scheme as a strategic choice of owners who wish
to maximize profits. Using an example in which a duopolistic market is studied, the paper
shows that giving managers incentives that combine profit and sales maximization might be
the dominant strategy for the owners.
which decisions are made cooperatively by managers who might have conflicting objectives.
The second is the managerial incentives scheme as a strategic choice of owners who wish
to maximize profits. Using an example in which a duopolistic market is studied, the paper
shows that giving managers incentives that combine profit and sales maximization might be
the dominant strategy for the owners.
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