Notes on N-lattices and constructive logic with strong negation
D Vakarelov - Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic …, 1977 - JSTOR
Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 1977•JSTOR
The logic mentioned in the title is introduced and investigated by Vorob'ev [1],[2],[3].
Vorob'ev claims that this logic is a formalization of the following idea, suggested by Nelson
[11] and Markov [4]. Usually we refute a sentence a either by reductio ad absurdum or by
construction of a counter-example of a. From the point of view of the constructive logic these
two ways are not equivalent, so we have two kinds of negation. Vorob'ev formalizes this idea
in a calculus which may be obtained from the intuitionistic propositional calculus by adding a …
Vorob'ev claims that this logic is a formalization of the following idea, suggested by Nelson
[11] and Markov [4]. Usually we refute a sentence a either by reductio ad absurdum or by
construction of a counter-example of a. From the point of view of the constructive logic these
two ways are not equivalent, so we have two kinds of negation. Vorob'ev formalizes this idea
in a calculus which may be obtained from the intuitionistic propositional calculus by adding a …
The logic mentioned in the title is introduced and investigated by Vorob'ev [1],[2],[3]. Vorob'ev claims that this logic is a formalization of the following idea, suggested by Nelson [11] and Markov [4]. Usually we refute a sentence a either by reductio ad absurdum or by construction of a counter-example of a. From the point of view of the constructive logic these two ways are not equivalent, so we have two kinds of negation. Vorob'ev formalizes this idea in a calculus which may be obtained from the intuitionistic propositional calculus by adding a new connec? tive~ corresponding to the new negation and the following six axioms:
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