Proportional budget allocations: Towards a systematization
arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.12324, 2022•arxiv.org
We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting
setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory
budgeting and test them on known proportionality-driven rules such as Phragm\'en and Rule
X. We investigate logical implications among old and new axioms and provide a systematic
overview of proportionality criteria in participatory budgeting.
setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory
budgeting and test them on known proportionality-driven rules such as Phragm\'en and Rule
X. We investigate logical implications among old and new axioms and provide a systematic
overview of proportionality criteria in participatory budgeting.
We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory budgeting and test them on known proportionality-driven rules such as Phragm\'en and Rule X. We investigate logical implications among old and new axioms and provide a systematic overview of proportionality criteria in participatory budgeting.
arxiv.org