Rationality, time and normativity: On Hedden's time-slice rationality
In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel
theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR
is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-
motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim
about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the
conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.
theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR
is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-
motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim
about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the
conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.
Abstract
In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.
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