CHIARA CORDeLLI make donations domestically? Call it the question of kind. A second question concerns how individuals (or foundations) should make these donations. Should donors be morally permitted to exercise personal discretion in deciding how much to give and to whom, given the sociopolitical context within which their giving takes place? Call it the question of discretion. By “personal discretion” here I mean the moral prerogative to appeal to agent-relative reasons when making a decision. Agent-relative reasons are reasons that are nonshared, for they make essential reference to a particular agent’s identity, life history, or personal projects. The question of discretion, thus, is the question of whether donors should be permitted to make their donative choices about how much to give and to whom, by appealing to these nonpublic reasons.

It is a widespread assumption, both in commonsense morality and in political discourse, that citizens should enjoy wide discretion in deciding how to direct charitable donations. For example, the British government (HM Government 2011), while advocating for the institutionalization of a system of philanthropy able to support the critical role of voluntary organizations in an era of government withdrawal, has argued that this system must be designed so as “to fit with people’s lifestyles and interests” and that giving should happen “on the back of free decisions by individuals to give to causes around them” that “they care about.” I call this the discretionary view. Besides politicians, philosophers tend to support the discretionary view, at least to some extent. For instance, Richard Miller (2004) holds the view that it is in part up to the individual to decide how to discharge her duty to give, according to her “personal policies.” He argues that one is permitted to donate resources to, say, help the blind rather than to fight infectious diseases—despite the fact that the second choice more effectively helps those in direst peril—if “one’s vision or life history” makes the first plight especially important to her (374).