Upon assuming its new statehood on 1 January 1993, the Czech Republic embarked on a journey to transform itself into an ordinary European society and nation, its Constitution making clear that it would be a law-abiding and democratic state founded on respect for the rights and freedoms of its citizens. 1 To reach the journey’s final destination of fully returning to Europe by joining its supranational and intergovernmental institutions, the government gave precedence to political, social, and economic transformations over security matters. 2 No serious public debates informed the decisions that had to be made on the shape, form, and functions of the country’s post–Cold War intelligence apparatus. The new elites were poorly equipped to deal with security—and particularly intelligence—matters because of both their serious lack of expertise and the more compelling competing priorities requiring their attention. Fundamental questions were thus not answered, and very few asked: Did the country really need an intelligence community (IC)? For what purpose? Of what size? How powerful should it be? And under whose control? The public, for its part, was distrustful and concerned that the intelligence services could again be turned against them. 3

Stéphane Lefebvre was Section Head—Strategic Analysis at the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), Ottawa when this article was written. He has written extensively on intelligence and security issues. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the government of Canada or any of its departments and agencies.