The attack on the Capitol on January 6 was an unprecedented event in US history. Across a wide swath of constitutional law, January 6 will have significant implications and consequences, most of which are likely not yet known. That is particularly true of constitutional doctrines governing congressional oversight and executive privilege. The select committee established by the House of Representatives to investigate the events on and leading up to January 6 has undertaken a monumental task of investigating, collecting, and reporting the facts surrounding the attack, and the January 6 committee has doggedly pursued an exhaustive investigation in furtherance of its originating purposes and functions. That pursuit-undertaken pursuant to Congress's implicit authority to conduct oversight-has generated numerous important precedents related to the scope of that authority and the constitutional doctrine of executive privilege, the executive branch's common defense to congressional oversight. This Essay undertakes a first attempt to understand the legacy of the precedents on congressional oversight and executive privilege generated by the January 6 investigation against the backdrop of the constitutional disputes that predated the committee's inception. Most importantly, perhaps, the committee's success-alongside several high-profile failuresdemonstrates forcefully the extent to which Congress must rely on the executive branch to assert its constitutional authority. The successes of the committee were almost wholly attributable to a