The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006).'The
suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp.
116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with
decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the
punishment path becoming negative.
suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp.
116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with
decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the
punishment path becoming negative.
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