Recent years have seen a burgeoning in phenomenological research on sport, physical cultures and exercise. As editors and reviewers, however, we frequently and consistently see social science articles that claim to be ‘phenomenological’or to use phenomenology, but the reasons for such claims are not always evident. Indeed, on closer reading, many such claims can often turn out to be highly problematic. At this point, we should clarify that our ‘terrain de sport’constitutes what has been termed ‘empirical phenomenology’(Martınková & Parry, 2011) and more specifically from our own ‘home’discipline, a phenomenologically inspired form of sociology. This latter tradition was developed in North America by Alfred Schütz (1972). By this, we do not mean philosophical phenomenology in all its rich and varied strands, the modern form of which was inspired by Edmund Husserl’s (1913/2002) descriptive and/or transcendental phenomenology. The term itself is derived from the Greek phainomenon, from the root phˆos, meaning ‘light’, thus referring to something that is placed in the light, made apparent or shown. Phenomenology is therefore the study of phenomena, things as they present themselves to, and are perceived in consciousness. Importantly, it is not just another form of qualitative research; a point which we discuss later.

It is perhaps worth (re) stating that what is often termed ‘modern’phenomenology (Embree & Mohanty, 1997) was developed from the work of Edmund Husserl (1913/2002) in his quest to question and unsettle traditional, scientific habits of thought that often left fundamental assumptions regarding a phenomenon or phenomena unquestioned and unproblematized. Several consistent, recurrent characteristics arose from Husserl’s work, which many still consider as core assumptions of the’phenomenological’approach. Although it is important to note that Husserl’s (1913/2002) phenomenological thinking underwent substantial reworking and revision throughout his lifetime, one of his key and consistent assertions was the insight that human consciousness is intentional; that is, it is always directed at something. Furthermore, Husserl’s notion of the phenomenological reduction lies at the heart of his work, as a methodical means of cutting through the layers of taken-for-grantedness that envelop a phenomenon, via the epoche–sometimes termed bracketing–allowing us to arrive at the eidos or core, essential characteristics of a phenomenon. Husserl advocated bracketing (standing back or aside from) our extant beliefs and presuppositions about a phenomenon as a central condition of phenomenological work, in order to return ‘to the things themselves’(zu den Sachen selbst). In his later writings, Husserl’s (1931/1988) focus shifted towards a consideration of the relationality of existence, with his focus on the Lebenswelt, or our commonsense ‘lifeworld’of everyday immediate experience. This lifeworld is subjectively experienced and intersubjectively constructed. For Husserl, accessing the Lebenswelt was rendered possible via the phenomenological method, which sought to bracket our natural attitude, or everyday, taken-for-granted ways of thinking and being. For many sociologists, however, the idea that we can actually stand outside of our own cultural and social-structural (and historical) location, is of course highly problematic, and has been questioned by subsequent authors within the existentialist phenomenological