One lesson from the aftermath of Hilary Putnam's (1981, chapter 2; 1980; 1978, part IV)
model-theoretic argument against realism is that meaning is not determined solely by our …

I PROPOSE to discuss first the nature of the main question which philosophers have been
asking, when they have concerned themselves with the problem of Personal Identity. Then I …

Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit's 'fission argument'for the
unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary …

Do they present a problem? It might be thought that they do not, because they could never
occur. I suspect that some of them could.(Some, for instance, might become scientifically …

There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of
what we call our Self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are …

It is clearly preferable to provide at least a sketch of a general theory of identity, of which the
account I will develop for personal identity will be a special case, rather than merely to give …

In the first of this series of articles Jerry Fodor set the scene for his discussion of mental
representation:" It rained for weeks and we were all so tired of ontology, but there didn't …

Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes
are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from …

AT times, even the best philosophical theories must resort to Procrustean techniques. A
frequent occasion is the attempt to confer respectability on some class of entities by giving …

My discussion here will be focused partly on what I will call the moral question of personal
identity: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and …