We assess the extent to which specialist doctors respond to local competition when setting
prices (including extra-billings) in a fee-for-service system. We use an exhaustive panel data …

We assess the extent to which specialist physicians respond to local competition when
deciding how much services to provide under a fee-for-service payment system. We use an …

We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous
research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal …

Concerns about healthcare affordability have grown in France as physician additional fees
have increased threefold in the last 20 years. In this paper, we develop an innovative …

This paper develops county-level estimates of HMO market share for all counties in the
United States and uses them to examine the relationship between HMO market share and …

We analyze the effect that competition between HMOs has on the cost and quality of medical
services. Our key result is that increasing competition enhances consumer utility while also …

We study the degree to which greater physician market power via consolidation leads to
higher service prices in the commercially insured medical-care market. We also examine …

The market for physician services is complicated by four factors: uncertainty, asymmetrical
information, agency and third-party payment of fees. These factors create market distortions …

Non-pecuniary sources of motivation are a strong feature of the health care sector and the
impact of competitive incentives may be lower where pecuniary motivation is low. We test …

We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total
budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves …