PPS: Privacy-preserving strategyproof social-efficient spectrum auction mechanisms

H Huang, XY Li, Y Sun, H Xu… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2014 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem,
and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social …

A general privacy-preserving auction mechanism for secondary spectrum markets

Q Huang, Y Gui, F Wu, G Chen… - IEEE/ACM Transactions …, 2015 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Auctions are among the best-known market-based tools to solve the problem of dynamic
spectrum redistribution. In recent years, a good number of strategy-proof auction …

Towards privacy preservation in strategy-proof spectrum auction mechanisms for noncooperative wireless networks

F Wu, Q Huang, Y Tao, G Chen - IEEE/ACM Transactions on …, 2014 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The problem of dynamic spectrum redistribution has been extensively studied in recent
years. Auctions are believed to be among the most effective tools to solve this problem. A …

Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization

R Zhu, KG Shin - 2015 IEEE conference on computer …, 2015 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The rapid growth of wireless mobile users and applications has led to high demand of
spectrum. Auction is a powerful tool to improve the utilization of spectrum resource, and …

SPRING: A strategy-proof and privacy preserving spectrum auction mechanism

Q Huang, Y Tao, F Wu - 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, 2013 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The problem of dynamic spectrum redistribution has been extensively studied in recent
years. Auction is believed to be one of the most effective tools to solve this problem. A great …

Truthful auction mechanisms with performance guarantee in secondary spectrum markets

H Huang, Y Sun, XY Li, S Chen… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2014 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We study a spectrum auction problem where each request from new spectrum users has
spatial, temporal, and spectral features. Our goal is to design truthful auction mechanisms …

THEMIS: Collusion-resistant and fair pricing spectrum auction under dynamic supply

Q Wang, Q Sun, K Ren, X Jia - IEEE Transactions on Mobile …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Spectrum auctions allow a spectrum owner to allocate scarce spectrum resources quickly to
the users that value them most. Previous solutions, while enabling reusability-driven and …

Differentially private spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization

R Zhu, Z Li, F Wu, K Shin, G Chen - … on mobile ad hoc networking and …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
Dynamic spectrum redistribution---under which spectrum owners lease out under-utilized
spectrum to users for financial gain---is an effective way to improve spectrum utilization …

A lightweight auction framework for spectrum allocation with strong security guarantees

K Cheng, L Wang, Y Shen, Y Liu… - IEEE INFOCOM 2020 …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Auction is an effective mechanism to distribute spectrum resources. Although many privacy-
preserving auction schemes for spectrum allocation have been proposed, none of them is …

Privacy-preserving and truthful double auction for heterogeneous spectrum

Q Wang, J Huang, Y Chen, X Tian… - IEEE/ACM Transactions …, 2019 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Over the past decades, there have been extensive research endeavors in spectrum auction
design. However, most solutions only focus on the allocation efficiency while ignoring the …