We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits
through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic …

We model competition between content distributors (platforms) for content providers, and
show that whether or not content is exclusive or “multihomes” depends crucially on whether …

The value of a two-sided platform to buyers depends critically on the variety of
complementary products available for it, and on their quality. The platform can choose the …

Selective promotion entails the exploitation of resources offered by individual
complementors to improve a proprietary platform's competitive position. However, as …

We consider pricing and product-bundling strategies for two competing platforms with two
groups of agents, customers and sellers (independent content developers). In this paper …

Many digital platforms give users a bundle of goods sourced from numerous creators,
generate revenue through consumption of these goods, and motivate creators by sharing of …

Multi-sided platforms must make decisions on both pricing and engineering investment and
must continually adjust them as the platform scales over its lifecycle. Engineering …

Platform owners have a number of strategic levers for managing the value of their
ecosystems. However, they must use them carefully: how and by whom that value is …

Research summary User demand affects the emergence and growth of platform ecosystems
through indirect network effects. But how do these effects play out in the strategies of …