Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-
contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual …

I argue that the ground of the epistemic force of perceptual states lies in properties of the
perceptual capacities that constitute the relevant perceptual states. I call this view …

There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly
between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the …

Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has
suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima …

Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the brain as in some
(perhaps merely approximate) sense implementing probabilistic inference. This suggests a …

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects
reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal …

I defend the view that mental states have degrees of strength. Our pains are more or less
intense, our mental imagery is more or less vivid, our visual perceptions are more or less …

This article re-examines Ned Block's (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have …

Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable
than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis …

Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of
detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular …