In typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are
not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war, strong …

We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country's resolve is a function of
intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown …

The “audience cost” literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to
credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming …

Many game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining find that under incomplete information, an
initial offer is either accepted, or war occurs. However, this finding is odd in two ways:(a) …

It is well known that during a crisis, unitary rational states have an incentive to misrepresent
their true resolve and willingness to go to war. This theoretical result has been taken to imply …

How do coalition partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining? I analyze a model in
which a potential coalition leader faces a trade‐off between signaling resolve to a target and …

The dissertation examines the use, interpretation, and effects of military threats employed in
international disputes. Drawing on recent developments in game theory, I argue that crisis …

When trying to change the status quo in their favor, leaders sometimes launch sudden faits
accomplis involving the costly, but limited, use of military force. In doing so, they hope that …

When states come to believe that other states are hostile to their interests, they often reorient
their foreign policies by realigning alliance commitments, building arms, striking first …

Both threats and assurances can be useful in international negotiations. Threats help
convince the adversary that a state will fight if challenged, and assurances can convince the …