In his earlier writings, Fred Dretske proposed an anti-skeptical strategy that is based on a
rejection of the view that knowledge is closed under known entailment. This strategy is …

Abstract According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if
and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the …

Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a
serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information …

Abstract Fred Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow of Information is an extended attempt to
develop a philosophically useful theory of information. Dretske adapts central ideas from …

Christoph Jäger (Erkenntnis 61: 187–201, 2004) has argued that Dretske's (Knowledge and
the flow of Information, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1981) information-based account of …

One common objection to Dretske's Information Theoretic Account of Knowledge (ITAK) is
that it violates closure. I show that it does not, and that extant arguments attempting to …

In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of
perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and …

Abstract Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by
Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of …

I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein's
remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske's information …

Fred Dretske notoriously claimed that knowledge closure sometimes fails. Crispin Wright
agrees that warrant does not transmit in the relevant cases, but only because the agent must …