Q Xing, B Wang, X Wang - Symmetry, 2018 - mdpi.com
Without the design for inherent security, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is vulnerable to prefix/subprefix hijacks and other attacks. Though many BGP security approaches have …
G He, W Su, S Gao, J Yue… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The inter-domain routing with BGP is highly vulnerable to malicious attacks, due to the lack of a secure means of verifying authenticity and legitimacy of inter-domain routes. Resource …
I Sfirakis, V Kotronis - arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.03172, 2019 - arxiv.org
Networks (Autonomous Systems-AS) allocate or revoke IP prefixes with the intervention of official Internet resource number authorities, and select and advertise policy-compliant paths …
The whole Internet consists of thousands of autonomous systems that transfer data with one another. The BGP plays a significant role in routing, but its behaviour is essentially naive …
A García-Martínez, S Angieri, B Liu, F Yang… - IEEE Systems …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The current mechanism to secure Border Gateway Protocol relies on the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) for route origin authorization. The RPKI implements a hierarchical …
We propose BlockJack, a system based on a distributed and tamper-proof consortium Blockchain that aims at blocking IP prefix hijacking in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In …
Securing the Internet's inter-domain routing system against illicit prefix advertisements by third-party networks remains a great concern for the research, standardization, and operator …
Abstract Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the default inter-domain routing protocol on the Internet, lacks inherent mechanisms to validate the prefix ownership and integrity of inter …
BGP is a gaping security hole in today's Internet, as evidenced by numerous Internet outages and blackouts, repeated traffic hijacking, and surveillance incidents. Yet, despite …