Principal–agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a
contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment …

In the last thirty years, much theoretical work has been expanded to draw the implications
from the fact that agents use their private information strategically. However, only recently …

The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection
in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium …

We explore the influence of experimental monitor cheap talk on offers in single-shot
ultimatum bargaining games. We find that behavior more closely resembles Nash …

People respond quickly when they have a clear preference and slowly when they are close
to indifference. The question is whether others exploit this tendency to infer private …

In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and
incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact …

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on
the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark …

We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior
beyond their direct economic consequences. A one-shot principal–agent experiment is …

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before
contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the …

A growing literature analyzes revenue-maximizing contracts for situations in which agents
can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the contract. It is …