Explaining unfair offers in ultimatum games and their effects on trust: An experimental approach

D De Cremer, E van Dijk, MM Pillutla - Business Ethics Quarterly, 2010 - cambridge.org
Unfair offers in bargaining may have disruptive effects because they may reduce
interpersonal trust. In such situations future trust may be strongly affected by social accounts …

The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis revisited

C Schmidt, R Zultan - None, 2005 - madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de
The experiment disentangles communication and social effect in face-to-face
communication. The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in …

A meeting of the minds: Informal agreements and social norms

EL Krupka, S Leider, M Jiang - Management Science, 2017 - pubsonline.informs.org
Using coordination games, we elicit social norms directly for two different games where
either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such …

The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment

R Sloof, J Sonnemans - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and
relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust …

The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game–does it even exist?

EE Demiral, J Mollerstrom - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020 - Elsevier
Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al.(1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in
the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to …

The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal: The case of private values

E Maskin, J Tirole - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990 - JSTOR
We analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information as a
three-stage noncooperative game: contract proposal, acceptance/refusal, and contract …

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees

DO Stahl, E Haruvy - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the
majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer …

The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information

D Besancenot, D Dubart, R Vranceanu - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2013 - Elsevier
Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game with an informed
proposer and an uninformed responder, where the former can send an unverifiable …

More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust, and crowding

I Bohnet, BS Frey, S Huck - American political science review, 2001 - cambridge.org
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and
contractors, are incomplete.“More law,” it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of …

[HTML][HTML] Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes☆

J Friedrichsen, K Momsen, S Piasenti - Journal of Behavioral and …, 2022 - Elsevier
In sequential interactions, both the agent's intention and the outcome of his choice may
influence the principal's action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more …