Bayesianism is a popular position (or perhaps, positions) in the philosophy of science,
epistemology, statistics, and other related areas, which represents belief as coming in …

In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are
important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally …

It is not inevitable that all propositions should have probabilities. That depends on what one
means by probability, a point to which I'll return. The claim that all propositions have …

There is one sense in which Bayes' theorem, and its use in statistics and in scientific
inference, is clearly uncontroversial. It is an authentic, certified, theorem of the probability …

I argue that Bayesians need two distinct notions of probability. We need the usual degree-of-
belief notion that is central to the Bayesian account of rational decision. But Bayesians also …

Bayesian ideas have recently been applied across such diverse fields as philosophy,
statistics, economics, psychology, artificial intelligence, and legal theory. Fundamentals of …

In Bayesian epistemology, the problem of the priors is this: How should we set our
credences (or degrees of belief) in the absence of evidence? That is, how should we set our …

Foundations of Bayesianism is an authoritative collection of papers addressing the key
challenges that face the Bayesian interpretation of probability today. Some of these papers …

How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing
take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and …

Bayesian ideas have recently been applied across such diverse fields as philosophy,
statistics, economics, psychology, artificial intelligence, and legal theory. Fundamentals of …