Critical infrastructure protection under imperfect attacker perception

E Jenelius, J Westin, ÅJ Holmgren - International Journal of Critical …, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper considers the problem of allocating finite resources among the elements of a
critical infrastructure system in order to protect it from antagonistic attacks. Previous studies …

Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism

VM Bier, F Kosanoglu - Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2015 - Elsevier
Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical
infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice …

[PDF][PDF] How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure Risk.

EF Taquechel, TG Lewis - Homeland security affairs, 2012 - core.ac.uk
We propose a definition of critical infrastructure deterrence and develop a methodology to
explicitly quantify the deterrent effects of critical infrastructure security strategies. We …

Two-stage invest–defend game: Balancing strategic and operational decisions

A Yolmeh, M Baykal-Gürsoy - Decision Analysis, 2019 - pubsonline.informs.org
Protecting infrastructures and their users against terrorist attacks involves making both
strategic and operational decisions in an organization's hierarchy. Although usually …

Why both game theory and reliability theory are important in defending infrastructure against intelligent attacks

VM Bier, LA Cox Jr, MN Azaiez - Game theoretic risk analysis of security …, 2008 - Springer
Many countries have multiple critical infrastructures that are potentially vulnerable to
deliberate attacks by terrorists or other intelligent adversaries. These include networked …

Target-hardening decisions based on uncertain multiattribute terrorist utility

C Wang, VM Bier - Decision Analysis, 2011 - pubsonline.informs.org
We present a game-theoretic model to explore how uncertainty about terrorist preferences
can affect optimal resource allocations for infrastructure protection. We consider a dynamic …

Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers

K Hausken - International Journal of Systems Science, 2011 - Taylor & Francis
Infrastructures are analysed subject to defence by a strategic defender and attack by
multiple strategic attackers. A framework is developed where each agent determines how …

Attack-defense game for critical infrastructure considering the cascade effect

F Chaoqi, G Yangjun, Z Jilong, S Yun, Z Pengtao… - Reliability Engineering & …, 2021 - Elsevier
The important status of critical infrastructure makes it a target of attacks in the new era.
Based on game theory, we analyze the offensive and defensive issues of critical …

[PDF][PDF] Game-theoretic analysis of attack and defense in cyber-physical network infrastructures

F He, J Zhuang, NSV Rao - IIE Annual Conference. Proceedings, 2012 - eng.buffalo.edu
Critical infrastructures rely on cyber and physical components that are both subject to
natural, incidental or intentional degradations. Game theory has been used in studying the …

On the effectiveness of security countermeasures for critical infrastructures

K Hausken, F He - Risk Analysis, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
A game‐theoretic model is developed where an infrastructure of N targets is protected
against terrorism threats. An original threat score is determined by the terrorist's threat …