Fairtradex: A decentralised exchange preventing value extraction

C McMenamin, V Daza, M Fitzi… - Proceedings of the 2022 …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
We present FairTraDEX, a decentralized exchange (DEX) protocol based on frequent batch
auctions (FBAs), which provides formal game-theoretic guarantees against extractable …

A gas-efficient superlight bitcoin client in solidity

S Daveas, K Karantias, A Kiayias… - Proceedings of the 2nd …, 2020 - dl.acm.org
Superlight clients enable the verification of proof-of-work-based blockchains by checking
only a small representative number of block headers instead of all the block headers as …

Publicly verifiable and secrecy preserving periodic auctions

HS Galal, AM Youssef - Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC …, 2021 - Springer
In lit markets, all the information about bids and offers in the order book is visible to the
public. With this transparency, traders can discover prices and adjust their strategies …

Pianist: Scalable zkrollups via fully distributed zero-knowledge proofs

T Liu, T Xie, J Zhang, D Song, Y Zhang - Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2023 - eprint.iacr.org
In the past decade, blockchains have seen various financial and technological innovations,
with cryptocurrencies reaching a market cap of over 1 trillion dollars. However, scalability is …

Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets

T Diamandis, A Evans, T Chitra… - 5th Conference on …, 2023 - drops.dagstuhl.de
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources
across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit …

Towards optimal prior-free permissionless rebate mechanisms, with applications to automated market makers & combinatorial orderflow auctions

B Mazorra, N Della Penna - arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.17024, 2023 - arxiv.org
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as
it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring …

Privacy and cryptocurrencies—A systematic literature review

L Herskind, P Katsikouli, N Dragoni - IEEE Access, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Our transaction history in the current centralized banking system has the ability to reveal a
lot of private information for each spender, both to the banking system itself, but also to those …

Fee-Redistribution Smart Contracts for Transaction-Fee-Based Regime of Blockchains with the Longest Chain Rule

R Budinský, I Homoliak, I Stančíková - arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.04910, 2023 - arxiv.org
In this paper, we review the undercutting attacks in the transaction-fee-based regime of proof-
of-work (PoW) blockchains with the longest chain fork-choice rule. Next, we focus on the …

Efficient rational proofs with strong utility-gap guarantees

J Chen, S McCauley, S Singh - … , SAGT 2018, Beijing, China, September 11 …, 2018 - Springer
As modern computing moves towards smaller devices and powerful cloud platforms, more
and more computation is being delegated to powerful service providers. Interactive proofs …

[PDF][PDF] An introduction to zero-knowledge proofs in blockchains and economics

A Berentsen, J Lenzi… - Federal Reserve Bank of St …, 2023 - files.stlouisfed.org
With a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), a party can prove that a statement is true without
revealing any information except for whether it is indeed true or not. The obvious benefit is …