The various literature on collectivity have generally focused on collectives that are unified (or
assumed to be unified) by “shared intentions”: mental or intentional states (1) possessed by …

In the literature on social ontology, two perspectives on collective agency have been
developed. The first is the internal perspective, the second the external one. The internal …

The capacity to engage in collective intentionality is a key aspect of human sociality. Social
coordination might not be distinctive of humans—various nonhuman animals engage in …

This chapter deals with a distinction between aggregate agency, shared agency, and
corporate agency. The idea of corporate agency is exciting insofar as it suggests that the …

Treating groups as agents is not at all difficult; teenagers and social scientists do it all the
time with great success. Reading Group Agency, though, makes it look like rocket science …

This paper explores an ontological approach to the issue of whether corporations, like
individuals, are morally responsible for their actions. More specifically, we investigate the …

corporate agents that are more sensitive to externalities and more prone to avoid them. I
generally talk about them as moral agents bound by moral obligations, but in a sense I …

Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including
collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective …

The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current
social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts …

This paper argues that the intentional actions of collective entities, such as corporations and
agencies, are not necessarily joint intentional actions by several members of those …