Noncooperative 802.11 mac layer fingerprinting and tracking of mobile devices

P Robyns, B Bonné, P Quax… - Security and …, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
We present two novel noncooperative MAC layer fingerprinting and tracking techniques for
Wi‐Fi (802.11) enabled mobile devices. Our first technique demonstrates how a per‐bit …

Defeating MAC address randomization through timing attacks

C Matte, M Cunche, F Rousseau… - Proceedings of the 9th …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
MAC address randomization is a common privacy protection measure deployed in major
operating systems today. It is used to prevent user-tracking with probe requests that are …

Active behavioral fingerprinting of wireless devices

S Bratus, C Cornelius, D Kotz, D Peebles - Proceedings of the first ACM …, 2008 - dl.acm.org
We propose a simple active method for discovering facts about the chipset, the firmware or
the driver of an 802.11 wireless device by observing its responses (or lack thereof) to a …

WLAN device fingerprinting using channel state information (CSI)

F Adamsky, T Retunskaia, S Schiffner, C Köbel… - Proceedings of the 11th …, 2018 - dl.acm.org
As of IEEE 802.11 n, a wireless Network Interface Card (NIC) uses Channel State
Information (CSI) to optimize the transmission over multiple antennas. CSI contain radio …

Wi-Fi tracking: Fingerprinting attacks and counter-measures

C Matte - 2017 - theses.hal.science
The recent spread of everyday-carried Wi-Fi-enabled devices (smartphones, tablets and
wearable devices) comes with a privacy threat to their owner, and to society as a whole …

Why MAC address randomization is not enough: An analysis of Wi-Fi network discovery mechanisms

M Vanhoef, C Matte, M Cunche, LS Cardoso… - Proceedings of the 11th …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
We present several novel techniques to track (unassociated) mobile devices by abusing
features of the Wi-Fi standard. This shows that using random MAC addresses, on its own …

Letting the puss in boots sweat: Detecting fake access points using dependency of clock skews on temperature

F Lanze, A Panchenko, B Braatz, T Engel - Proceedings of the 9th ACM …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
The only available IEEE 802.11 network identifiers (ie, the network name and the MAC
address) can be easily spoofed. Consequently, an attacker is able to fake a real hotspot and …

11 user fingerprinting

J Pang, B Greenstein, R Gummadi, S Seshan… - Proceedings of the 13th …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
The ubiquity of 802.11 devices and networks enables anyone to track our every move with
alarming ease. Each 802.11 device transmits a globally unique and persistent MAC address …

Passive Data Link Layer 802.11 Wireless Device Driver Fingerprinting.

J Franklin, D McCoy, P Tabriz, V Neagoe… - USENIX Security …, 2006 - usenix.org
Motivated by the proliferation of wireless-enabled devices and the suspect nature of device
driver code, we develop a passive fingerprinting technique that identifies the wireless device …

Fingerprinting Wi-Fi devices using software defined radios

TD Vo-Huu, TD Vo-Huu, G Noubir - … of the 9th ACM Conference on …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11), is emerging as the primary medium for wireless Internet access.
Cellular carriers are increasingly offloading their traffic to Wi-Fi Access Points to overcome …