Bank bailouts are not “one-shot” events, but rather dynamic processes that occur over
phases that often last for months or years. Regulators “catch” financially-distressed banks …

During the global financial crisis, governments bailed out banks when their failures
threatened to undermine economic and financial stability. After the crisis, governments tried …

We explore how large and small banks make funding decisions when system-wide bailouts
are possible. We show that bank size, purely on strategic grounds, is a key determinant of …

“Designed to resolve failed banks via loss-sharing by shareholders and creditors, bail-ins
were introduced to substitute bailouts, which are known to create moral hazards in banks …

This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model
of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail …

We develop a tractable dynamic contracting framework to study bank bail-in regimes. In the
presence of a repeated monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines …

This paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in
tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and …

This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks' funding costs,
incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two …

We develop a dynamic model of optimal regulatory design of three regimes that deal with
distress of large, complex banking organizations. These regimes are 1) bailout, as under …

Many of the world's developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce,
bank bail-in regimes. Both the planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability …