A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy
positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data …

Most theoretic models of multiparty electoral competition make the assumption that party
leaders are motivated to maximize their vote share or seat share. In plurality-rule systems …

We present cross‐national analyses–both cross‐sectional and longitudinal–estimating the
vote shares for approximately 80 parties across Western Europe from 1984 to 1998. The …

We contrast social-structural theories of voting behavior with spatial theories of voting
behavior to explain voter choice in the Netherlands and Great Britain. We hypothesize that …

Existing applications of spatial modeling to historical elections suggest that parties rarely
maximize votes. This complicates the analyst's task because explanations of party behavior …

Formal stochastic models of voting have concluded that vote maximizing parties will
converge to the mean of the electoral distribution. Much empirical evidence has concluded …

Spatial models of electoral competition locate voters and parties at points in euclidean
space—representing issue positions—and specify utility of voters for parties as functions of …

In recent years a lively debate has emerged concerning the empirical status of the traditional
proximity spatial model versus a directional model of voter choice. The central reason for this …

The formal stochastic model of voting should be the theoretical benchmark against which
empirical models can be gauged. A standard result in the formal model is the 'mean voter …

Existing spatial models of multiparty spatial competition have difficulty accounting for two
related features of party behavior: that parties typically propose divergent policy programs …