The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection
in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium …

This article studies how delay in contracting depends on an exogenous signal. The agent
whose cost is his private information may produce in the first period or be delayed until the …

The dynamics of a stochastic, two–period principal–agent relationship is studied. The
agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the …

We study how long‐term contracts condition on a natural flow of information that reduces
asymmetric information over time. If such interim information is verifiable, optimal contracts …

A growing literature analyzes revenue-maximizing contracts for situations in which agents
can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the contract. It is …

We examine the strategic role of information transmission in a repeated principal-agent
relationship where the agent produces information that is useful to the principal. The agent …

This paper examines how the possibility of renegotiation affects contractual outcomes in
environments in which adverse selection is a problem. The game setup is an extension of …

I study information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. In my model, an agent
learns his payoff type only after accepting a contract, but can at costs acquire imperfect …

Several recent papers have emphasized that long-term relationships can be efficiently
governed by short-term contracts, provided that there is no asymmetric information at the …

I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. The
asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show that …