Spoiled onions: Exposing malicious Tor exit relays

P Winter, R Köwer, M Mulazzani, M Huber… - … Symposium, PETS 2014 …, 2014 - Springer
Tor exit relays are operated by volunteers and together push more than 1 GiB/s of network
traffic. By design, these volunteers are able to inspect and modify the anonymized network …

Enhancing security and privacy of tor's ecosystem by using trusted execution environments

S Kim, J Han, J Ha, T Kim, D Han - 14th USENIX Symposium on …, 2017 - usenix.org
With Tor being a popular anonymity network, many attacks have been proposed to break its
anonymity or leak information of a private communication on Tor. However, guaranteeing …

An anonymity vulnerability in Tor

Q Tan, X Wang, W Shi, J Tang… - IEEE/ACM Transactions …, 2022 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Privacy is currently one of the most concerned issues in Cyberspace. Tor is the most widely
used system in the world for anonymously accessing Internet. However, Tor is known to be …

Characterizing the nature and dynamics of tor exit blocking

R Singh, R Nithyanand, S Afroz, P Pearce… - 26th USENIX Security …, 2017 - usenix.org
Facing abusive traffic from the Tor anonymity network, online service providers discriminate
against Tor users. In this study, we characterize not only the extent of such discrimination but …

[PDF][PDF] Inside Job: Applying Traffic Analysis to Measure Tor from Within.

R Jansen, M Juarez, R Galvez, T Elahi, C Diaz - NDSS, 2018 - homes.esat.kuleuven.be
In this paper, we explore traffic analysis attacks on Tor that are conducted solely with middle
relays rather than with relays from the entry or exit positions. We create a methodology to …

Honey onions: a framework for characterizing and identifying misbehaving tor hsdirs

A Sanatinia, G Noubir - 2016 IEEE Conference on …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In the last decade, Tor proved to be a very successful and widely popular system to protect
users' anonymity. However, Tor remains a practical system with a variety of limitations, some …

Identifying and characterizing Sybils in the Tor network

P Winter, R Ensafi, K Loesing, N Feamster - 25th USENIX Security …, 2016 - usenix.org
Being a volunteer-run, distributed anonymity network, Tor is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Little
is known about real-world Sybils in the Tor network, and we lack practical tools and methods …

{RAPTOR}: Routing attacks on privacy in tor

Y Sun, A Edmundson, L Vanbever, O Li… - 24th USENIX Security …, 2015 - usenix.org
The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication. However, Tor is
known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe traffic at both ends of the …

[PDF][PDF] One Bad Apple Spoils the Bunch: Exploiting {P2P} Applications to Trace and Profile Tor Users

S Le Blond, P Manils, A Chaabane, MA Kaafar… - 4th USENIX Workshop …, 2011 - usenix.org
Tor is a popular low-latency anonymity network. However, Tor does not protect against the
exploitation of an insecure application to reveal the IP address of, or trace, a TCP stream. In …

The effect of dns on tor's anonymity

B Greschbach, T Pulls, LM Roberts, P Winter… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2016 - arxiv.org
Previous attacks that link the sender and receiver of traffic in the Tor network (" correlation
attacks") have generally relied on analyzing traffic from TCP connections. The TCP …