Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of
detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular …

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the
scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the …

Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between 'phenomenal'consciousness
(rich) and 'access' consciousness (limited). Here, we argue that the empirical evidence for …

Abstract 'Why would we do anything at all if the doing was not doing something to us?'In
other words: What is consciousness good for? Here, reversing classical views, according to …

Any physical explanation of consciousness seems to leave unresolved the 'explanatory gap':
Isn't it conceivable that all the elements in that explanation could occur, with the same …

The nature of consciousness is considered one of science's most perplexing and persistent
mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise …

This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of
components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct …

Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can
you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and …

The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the
relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (ie …

Phenomenal consciousness is often thought to involve a first-person perspective or point of
view which makes available to the subject categorically private, first-person facts about …