This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender
(S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that …

… We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately
informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in …

… This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where,
each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an …

… We design a relatively simple game of strategic information transmission with discrete
states, messages and actions. The most informative equilibrium of this game ranges from the …

This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication
setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be …

… The simplest formal representations of strategic information transmission are sender– receiver
games. A single privately informed sender sends a message to a receiver who responds …

… Our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission
models of Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982), and Jerry Green and Nancy Stokey (1980). …

… here for strategic information transmission (save whether to become informed at all). However,
there are many circumstances when it is inappropriate to assume the receiver has such …

IF THE SENDER'S PREFERENCES are monotonic in the Receiver's action, then it is known
that the Sender reveals its type in every sequential equilibrium of a Sender-Receiver game …

… This paper studies multi-player strategic information transmission. We consider a setting in
which multiple decision makers have private incomplete information about a state of the world…