Affiliated common value auctions with differential information: the two bidder case
SO Parreiras - Contributions in Theoretical Economics, 2006 - degruyter.com
I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …
Contributions to Theoretical Economics
SO Parreiras - degruyter.com
I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the
twobuyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions …
twobuyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions …
Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
SO Parreiras - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …
Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
SO Parreiras - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006 - search.proquest.com
I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …