Protests against the Russian Orthodox Church are a recurrent phenomenon in the present-day Russian Federation. In most cases, they are triggered by the various connections existing between said Church on the one hand, and Russian political and business structures on the other hand. These protests frequently receive media attention, especially in social media that remain to a large degree under state control. In some instances, however, these protests assume the form of religious blasphemy aimed either at Church-State relations, at the Orthodox Church or at Christianity as such (the Russian media usually identify Christianity with Orthodoxy).

Blasphemy in Russian public life and other forms of anti-church protests are thus generally political in nature. A prime example of this bias is the performance of Pussy Riot in 2012 which, despite being superficially blasphemous (the participants parodied an Orthodox prayer in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour), was mostly aimed at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political system. ¹ Additionally, the repression that the participants in the protest faced, despite charges being formally based on the law regarding the offence of feelings of religious believers, were politically inspired. This fact seems to have eluded numerous politicians and celebrities engaged in the defence of Pussy Riot. Similarly, protests that took place in the city of Yekaterinburg in 2019 against the construction of a church and building complex replacing the existing park had a political nature–their mass character convincing regional and federal authorities to suspend building work. For despite the anti-church rhetoric, the protests were directed at the close connections between local officials and Russian oligarchs (some of these fabulously rich representatives of business were to fund