A note on tight extensive game forms
VW Kolpin - International Journal of Game Theory, 1988 - Springer
International Journal of Game Theory, 1988•Springer
Associated with each extensive game form are the α-and β-effectivity functions, E α and E β.
These functions characterize the effective capabilities which coalitions command under
pessimistic and optimistic cooperative behavior respectively. A game form is said to be tight
when E α≡ E β, in which case pessimistic, optimistic, and intermediate types of behavior all
support the same effective power. Dalkey's condition for Nash consistency, essentially
perfect information, is found to be a necessary and sufficient condition for a game form to be …
These functions characterize the effective capabilities which coalitions command under
pessimistic and optimistic cooperative behavior respectively. A game form is said to be tight
when E α≡ E β, in which case pessimistic, optimistic, and intermediate types of behavior all
support the same effective power. Dalkey's condition for Nash consistency, essentially
perfect information, is found to be a necessary and sufficient condition for a game form to be …
Abstract
Associated with each extensive game form are the α- and β-effectivity functions,E α andE β. These functions characterize the effective capabilities which coalitions command under pessimistic and optimistic cooperative behavior respectively. A game form is said to be tight whenE α ≡E β, in which case pessimistic, optimistic, and intermediate types of behavior all support the same effective power. Dalkey's condition for Nash consistency, essentially perfect information, is found to be a necessary and sufficient condition for a game form to be tight.
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