In August 2014 news of Viktor Orbán’s “secret Bible” made headlines in the Hungarian media. Journalists claimed that the “political science gossip” was true and that the “Orbán system” closely followed the ideas of Tilo Schabert’s 1989 book Boston Politics: The creativity of power (Tóth 2014). In this book Schabert presents the approach to politics of Kevin White, the mayor of Boston from 1968–84, to support his own theory of the “primacy of persons”—and not of institutions—in politics (Gontier 2015). The information that Viktor Orbán could be the follower of a Western (German) political theorist was, to say the least, sensational: earlier analyses concluded that Orbán and his party Fidesz were rather opportunistic and idiosyncratic in their political choices and cannot be easily pinned down to any political current. These analyses referred to Orbán and Fidesz as following a loosely defined form of “socially conservative”(Kiss 2002, 745) populism (Egedy 2009). The information also turned out to be grossly inaccurate and exaggerated: not only was it difficult to verify what books Orbán “kept on his bedside table,” it also turned out that Boston Politics was not so much Orbán’s favorite, but rather a book (along with works of Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss) that some of his aides read and considered the best description of the prime minister’s approach to politics. The story about Schabert’s 1989 book connection to Hungary is nevertheless far from trivial: it helped draw attention to the political ideas supported by leading figures at the Fidesz-allied “Századvég” think tank, who had been trying since the 2000s to formulate the key ideas driving the Fidesz agenda in the case of a return to power. After eight years as the leader of the opposition, former (1998–2002) Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán returned to power with a sweeping victory in 2010. Not only did this victory earn, for the pre-electoral coalition between Fidesz and the small Christian-democratic party KDNP, the “supermajority” needed for constitutional changes, the entire Hungarian party system, which was regarded as one of the few consolidated ones in East Central Europe, collapsed as a result. The main opposition party, the post-communist “Hungarian Socialist Party,” in power between 2002 and 2010, lost more than half its voters and earned a historical low of 21 percent of the vote. Orbán won with the promise of