In this paper, we evaluate the security of lightweight block ciphers PRESENT, Piccolo and LED against biclique cryptanalysis. To recover the secret key of PRESENT-80/128, our attacks require full PRESENT-80 encryptions and full PRESENT-128 encryptions, respectively. Our attacks on Piccolo-80/128 require computational complexities of and , respectively. The attack on a -round reduced LED-64 needs 29-round reduced LED-64 encryptions. In the cases of LED-80/96/128, we propose the attacks on two versions. First, to recover the secret key of -round reduced LED-80/96/128, our attacks require computational complexities of and , respectively. To attack the full version, we require computational complexities of and , respectively. However, in these cases, we need the full codebook. These results are superior to known biclique cryptanalytic results on them.