This article presents a commentary on Stellan Ohlsson's (2009) theory of conceptual change
by resubsumption and competitive evaluation of cognitive utility. We note two features of
Ohlsson's theory that we think are particularly strong. We then argue that Ohlsson's theory
explains one route to conceptual change but that there are many other routes to conceptual
change that require mechanisms other than Ohlsson's. We discuss a number of these
multiple routes to conceptual change. Theories of conceptual change should attempt to …

The three commentaries on the resubsumption theory highlight three key ideas: that the term
conceptual change, as commonly used, is ambiguous between “change in the meaning of a
concept” and “change in what someone believes”; that there are multiple routes to
successful learning of conceptual subject matters; and that the noticing of a previously
unheeded contrast can be as strong a driver of change as the noticing of an unheeded
similarity. These ideas are consistent with the resubsumption theory. Other arguments and …