… In this paper we examine equilibrium incentive contracts in an oligopoly. We show that
profit-… of other managers' incentives since each manager will react to the incentives given to …

… We consider the incentives for oligopolistic manufacturers to adopt exclusive … , oligopolistic
manufacturers may not choose exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing enhances the incentive …

… ex post incentive to fulfill. Thus the closed-loop Nash equilibrium is not a good solution
concept. To avoid this problem, we should make it a requirement of an equilibrium strategy that …

… We build a model of oligopoly under general equilibrium, allowing firms to be large in relation
to the economy, and then examine the effect of oligopoly on macroeconomic performance. …

… and the equilibrium quantities (6)-(8), we find that the incentive to merge can be simplified
to … not always be an incentive to merge. For the dominant oligopoly model, the conjectural …

… Even so, we show that the Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game entails the oligopolistic
firms dividing production among autonomous, competing units. The reason is that such a …

… Under the postulated axioms we show the equivalence of agreed allocations with the set
of oligopoly equilibria. It is argued that the principle of ‘Lindahl agreements’ may have wider …

… In this paper we study questions of oligopoly and competition in a general equilibrium
framework. In particular, we consider the Nash equilibria of a model of noncooperative exchange …

… when the Cournot equilibrium is "interior", then it does not yield Pareto optimal profits. Pareto
optimality is used here in a special sense: within a partial equilibrium oligopoly model, an …

… We first show that such equilibria are inefficient, with both firms … of equilibria as a function
of the bargaining weight of the welfare-maximizing faction. We show that equilibrium welfare …