Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game

A Farmer, P Pecorino - Public Choice, 1999 - Springer
Public Choice, 1999Springer
Legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent-seeking contest. In civil
litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the
outcome of the contest. Institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart
in other rent-seeking contests. The endogenous decision to participate in the rent-seeking
contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case, and the decision by the
defendant to defend it. The desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the …
Abstract
Legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent-seeking contest. In civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest. Institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent-seeking contests. The endogenous decision to participate in the rent-seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case, and the decision by the defendant to defend it. The desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology.
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