Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a
later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to
disclose short-term information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are
sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of
the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively,
reducing price informativeness, which in turn increases information acquisition by late …

Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a
later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to
disclose shortterm information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are
sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of
the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively,
reducing price informativeness, which in turn increases information acquisition by late …