Saikrishna Prakash* Judging from the text of the Commerce Clause, one might expect and conclude that the words" regulate commerce" must have the same meaning throughout the Clause.'Whatever the meaning of" commerce," it presumably has the same meaning whether that commerce takes place" among the states" or occurs

" with foreign nations." Likewise, the power to" regulate" commerce among the states presumptively is the same power that Congress has to" regulate" commerce with Indian tribes. Indeed, one might say that there is only one power-the power to regulate commerce-that applies to three situations. This" unified commerce clause theory" builds upon an appealing and intuitive norm: Absent some reason to the contrary, we should conclude that a word found in more than one place in a document has the same meaning throughout the document. In the past, the Supreme Court has applied this presumption in statutory interpretation. 2 More recently, Professor Amar attached a name to this presumption-" intratextualism. 3 In particular, Professor Amar argued that readers of the Constitution ought to pay more attention to intratextualism as a means of squeezing meaning from the Constitution. While Professors Vermeule and Young have criticized various aspects of Amar's claims, particularly Amar's views on the coherence of the Con-