Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas
JH Cassing, AL Hillman - Journal of International Economics, 1985 - Elsevier
JH Cassing, AL Hillman
Journal of International Economics, 1985•ElsevierTariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances. This paper pursues
the implications of one such circumstance—domestic market power—for the political choice
of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model. Tariffs
dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives. In the
presence of revenue seeking, ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff
or quota levels. Also, some welfare implications emerge.
the implications of one such circumstance—domestic market power—for the political choice
of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model. Tariffs
dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives. In the
presence of revenue seeking, ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff
or quota levels. Also, some welfare implications emerge.
Abstract
Tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances. This paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance — domestic market power — for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model. Tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives. In the presence of revenue seeking, ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels. Also, some welfare implications emerge.
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