This paper studies pricing and investment decisions on a congested transport corridor
where the elements of the corridor are controlled by different governments. A corridor can be
an interstate highway or railway line, or an inter-modal connection. We model the simplest
corridor: two transport links in series, where each of the links is controlled by a different
government. Each link is used by transit as well as by local traffic; both links are subject to
congestion. We consider a two-stage non-cooperative game where both governments …

This paper studies pricing and investment decisions on a congested transport corridor
where the elements of the corridor are controlled by different governments. A corridor can be
an interstate highway or railway line, or an inter-modal connection. We model the simplest
corridor: two transport links in series, where each of the links is controlled by a different
government. Each link is used by transit as well as by local traffic; both links are subject to
congestion. We consider a two stage non-cooperative game where both governments …