The core of a repeated n-person cooperative game
J Oviedo - European Journal of Operational Research, 2000 - Elsevier
European Journal of Operational Research, 2000•Elsevier
We study the core of a repeated cooperative game. We define the repeated cooperative
game as a repeated game where in each round the agents play a cooperative game. We
introduce an imputation sequence and a dominated imputation sequence. We define the
core of the repeated game as the set of all undominated imputation sequences. We show
that the core of a repeated cooperative game contains the core of the original cooperative
game.
game as a repeated game where in each round the agents play a cooperative game. We
introduce an imputation sequence and a dominated imputation sequence. We define the
core of the repeated game as the set of all undominated imputation sequences. We show
that the core of a repeated cooperative game contains the core of the original cooperative
game.
We study the core of a repeated cooperative game. We define the repeated cooperative game as a repeated game where in each round the agents play a cooperative game. We introduce an imputation sequence and a dominated imputation sequence. We define the core of the repeated game as the set of all undominated imputation sequences. We show that the core of a repeated cooperative game contains the core of the original cooperative game.
Elsevier