One of the major consequences of the winds of change blowing through Africa since the early 1990s has been the search for more effective methods of promoting good governance. The Ombudsman institution is increasingly regarded as one of the best means of achieving this. In 1995, Botswana established its first Ombudsman institution and appointed the first office holder two years later. As one of the few successful multiparty democracies in Africa, it is a somewhat a mystery why this important institution, long regarded as a hallmark of democracy, was established only recently. This paper examines this new institution in the light of its short history and in the context of comparable institutions elsewhere and assesses its capacity to counter the spectre of abuse of power and maladministration which, since 1990 had begun to creep ominously into this erstwhile African island of clean and efficient government. An analysis of the Act shows that it is almost wholly copied from the much-criticised British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act, 1967. Like the British Act, the Botswana Act is sometimes formulated in obscure language and contains so many restrictions that it renders the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman uncertain and unpredictable. Much as its effectiveness depends on the personality of the Ombudsman and the manner in which he exercises the wide-ranging discretion conferred on him, it is suggested that the Act needs to be revised. As Ombudsman institutions or their equivalents become part of the new constitutional order in Africa, caution needs to be exercised when replicating some of the older models. It is argued that the objective of ensuring effective government accountability would have been made more likely if the Botswana legislature had adopted some of the more progressive and innovative approaches found in most post-1990 Ombudsmen legislation, especially in the Southern African region.