The open future: Bivalence, determinism and ontology
In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often
get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is
compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to
the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is
open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is
compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to
the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is
open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
Abstract
In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
Springer
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