The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief
E Sullivan-Bissett, P Noordhof - Philosophical Studies, 2020 - Springer
Philosophical Studies, 2020•Springer
We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to
believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic
deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm
to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief
formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory
credentials had better look elsewhere.
believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic
deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm
to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief
formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory
credentials had better look elsewhere.
Abstract
We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
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