This paper proposes an approach to mitigate epidemic spread in a population of strategic
agents by encouraging safer behaviors through carefully designed rewards. These rewards …

We propose a system theoretic approach to select and stabilize the endemic equilibrium of
an SIRS epidemic model in which the decisions of a population of strategically interacting …

We extend to two populations a recently proposed system theoretic framework for studying
an epidemic influenced by the strategic behavior of a single population's agents. Our …

A major factor contributing to the difficulties in epidemic forecasting is the unpredictable
nature of the population behavior that can either mitigate or exacerbate the spread of a …

We consider a dynamic game setting in which a large population of strategic individuals
decides whether to adopt protective measures to protect themselves against an infectious …

A recent article that combines normalized compartmental epidemic models and population
games put forth a system theoretic approach to capture the coupling between a population's …

We present a dynamic population game model to capture the behavior of a large population
of individuals in presence of an infectious disease or epidemic. Individuals can be in one of …

Motivated by the models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg
mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents whose states evolve …

We consider the class of SIS epidemic models in which a large population of individuals
chooses whether to adopt protection or to remain unprotected as the epidemic evolves. For …

In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction
and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic …