We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which
players' actions are strategic substitutes (a negative feedback BCG). Our results show that …

Many models of economic behavior are based on the assumption that agents select
strategies that maximize utility believing that all others do the same (are equally rational) …

We present a model for the α-beauty contest that explains common patterns in experimental
data of one-shot and iterative games. The approach is based on two basic assumptions …

Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory.
One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs …

This paper analyzes strategic choice in p-beauty contests. First, I show that it is not generally
a best reply to guess the expected target value, even in games with n> 2 players, and that …

In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the
cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 …

We examine strategic awareness in experimental games, that is, the question of whether
subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others' actions …

Publisher Summary This chapter presents data from a series of experiments with human
subjects to test how individuals form expectations of others' expectations. The experiment …

We introduce a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic choice in one shot
games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3 guessing game in the …

We study the impact of social learning on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty‐
contest game. Naive advice and observation of others' decisions as two forms of social …