Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform
kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the …

A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular
natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to …

Psychologists of concepts' traditional assumption that there are many properties common to
all concepts has been subject to devastating critiques in psychology and in the philosophy of …

How are the meanings of words, events, and objects represented and organized in the
brain? This question, perhaps more than any other in the field, probes some of the deepest …

I discuss Edouard Machery's claim that philosophers and psychologists when using the term
'concept'are really theorizing about different things. This view is not new, but it has never …

Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and
cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal …

A standard view within psychology is that there have been two important shifts in the study of
concepts and that each has led to some improvements. The first shift was from the classical …

Issues related to concepts and categorization are nearly ubiquitous in psychology because
of people's natural tendency to perceive a thing as something. We have a powerful impulse …

There is a Standard Objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars,
or stereotypes): Because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes …

In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept
representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that …