The presence of credit constraints can shape the entry, growth, and size distribution of firms.
In this paper, I consider the optimal contract between banks and entrepreneurs in an …

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the
principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for …

Several empirical studies suggest that lending terms are eased in expansions and tightened
in recessions, thereby influencing the mix of financed entrepreneurs. We study a model of …

I study the implications of the limited enforceability of credit contracts for inequality and
economic growth. I introduce limited enforcement into a deterministic neoclassical growth …

We study the effects of credit shocks in a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs,
financing constraints, and a realistic firm-size distribution. As entrepreneurial firms can grow …

This paper studies the effects of credit market imperfections on output, the average size and
distribution of firms and the level of financial intermediation of the economy. We build a …

We study the negative feedback loop between the aggregate default rate and the efficacy of
enforcement in a model of debt-financed entrepreneurial activity. The novel feature of our …

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of capital accumulation where credit is
intermediated by banks operating in a Cournot oligopoly. The number of banks affects …

We analyze under what conditions competitive credit markets are efficient in providing loans
to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent …

This paper models a two-way dynamic feedback mechanism between bank lending
standards and firm entry. The composition of the borrower pool affects banks' screening …